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Abstract 
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 The reasons for delegating decisions to groups are varied but they often are based on one 
of two goals (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003).  One goal is identify what is commonly believed or 
preferred among a set of stakeholders.  Another goal is to pool member expertise and 
informational resources.  In pursuit of this latter goal, group discussion is viewed as a mechanism 
for combining diverse information in order to reach a more informed decision – the group as an 
information processing body (Larsen and Christensen, 1993; Hinsz, et al, 1997).  This 
information processing function is important when decision tasks are complex and 
informationally rich.    For example, consider a group of fund managers putting their heads 
together to construct an investment portfolio.  On the one hand, they could simply vote on which 
are the best investments, allocating funds based on the popularity of the investment options 
among the fund managers.  On the other hand, they could discuss the investment options, 
combining their knowledge in order to identify which options offer the greatest potential for 
financial growth.  Based on this pooled knowledge, each manager may revise her assessments of 
the options leading to group selections that none of the managers favoured initially.  In this paper, 
we examine this information pooling function in teams of executives completing a personnel 
selection task. 
 First, we review the experimental literature on information pooling during discussions of 
decision-making groups.  The theme of this literature is that groups tend to discuss information 
that is widely known among members before discussion at the expense of considering unique 
information that members bring to the discussion.  This focus is evident in both what is 
mentioned during discussion and what is repeated after being mentioned (e.g. Stasser, Taylor & 
Hanna, 1989; Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996).  Similarly, when groups produce 
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written summaries of their discussions, they are more likely to include information that was 
widely known before discussion than information that only one member knew before discussion 
(Stewart and Stasser, 1995). 
 Second, we will identify some relevant differences between the decision task and the 
participants in this study and those used in the typical laboratory investigation of information 
pooling.  An obvious difference is that much of the laboratory work has used volunteer 
participants recruited from college courses (for a notable exception see Larson et al., 1996) 
whereas this paper uses archival data obtained during a simulated hiring exercise completed by 
high-level executives attending a leadership training course.  Another difference is that the 
decision task completed by the executives was more complex than the typical laboratory decision 
task. Also, in the typical laboratory study, information access is controlled by the experimenter 
whereas the executives were allowed free access to an extensive data base containing information 
about the decision options. 
 Finally, we will develop hypotheses about the factors that shape the discussion content of 
these executive teams and the written summaries that they composed at the end of their 
discussion.   Also of interest is how information overlap among members (cognitive centrality, 
Kameda, Ohtsubo, & Takezawa, 1997) is related to social influence among these executives. 
The aforementioned information processing function of group discussion implicitly 
assumes that groups can in theory make better decisions than their individual members acting 
alone.  Groups have the potential to make better decisions than individuals, if (1) n heads know 
more than one, (2) individuals exchange critical, new information with one another, (3) others 
accept this information as valid, and (4) the group uses their pooled information to make an 
informed decision (Hastie, 1986; Stasser, 1992). From an information pooling perspective, 
information that is known to only one group member is an important commodity that an 
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individual brings to the group decision-making table. Indeed, expertise is often defined by 
uniquely held information.  As such, experts are perceived to have specialized, unique knowledge 
of a topic, process, or task, and they are often ascribed high status as a testament to the value of 
holding unique information (e.g., Bottger, 1984). Even non-experts often have uniquely known 
information that is necessary to identify a good decision and, when this is so, effective 
information pooling is the key to the group’s success. Because groups frequently do not consider 
the diversity of information available to them, they risk making suboptimal decisions, particularly 
when unique information is critical to a good decision (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 
1996; Hollingshead, 1996; Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
Discussion favors Common Information 
The experimental evidence strongly supports that conclusion that widely-shared 
information dominates discussion and uniquely-held information is often omitted from 
discussion.  This advantage to widely-shared or common information can be quite substantial.  
For example, Stasser et al. (1989) requested that groups spend 15 minutes discussing information 
about three decision options before trying to reach a decision.   Six-person groups who followed 
this procedure mentioned 70% of the information given to all the members before discussion but 
only 21% of the information that single individuals knew.   There are two reasons for this bias 
that are suggested by the experimental literature: advocacy and information sampling dynamics. 
 In advocacy, members bias their contributions to discussion to support their initial 
preferences (Schultz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, and Moscovici, 2000; Stasser and Titus, 1985; 
Stasser, 1988).  This bias may arise for several reasons.  First, information that is consistent with 
one's preference may be more salient when searching for items to contribute to discussion.  
Second, members may be prone to defend their initial choices.  Because common information has 
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more influence on initial individual preferences than unique information (the common knowledge 
effect; Gigone and Hastie, 1993, 1996), members' defense of their initial preferences will tend to 
promote the discussion of common information.   
The structural effects of collective information sampling also favor common information 
over unique information.  Even in the absence of advocacy, groups are more likely to mention an 
item of common information than an equally salient item of unique information.  Stasser and 
Titus’s (1987) collective information sampling (CIS) model suggests that one reason common 
information is discussed more often is due to sampling probabilities. Their model states that the 
probability that a piece of information will be mentioned is a function of how many people could 
potentially mention it and the likelihood that any one of those members will mention it. 
According to this model, common information has a greater probability of being discussed than 
unique information because of the greater number of people who know common information and 
can mention it. That is, common information will only fail to be discussed if every member of the 
group fails to mention it. Conversely, unique information will fail to be discussed if only one 
member (the member who knows the information) fails to mention it. As Larson, et al. (1996) 
reasoned, the opportunities for items of common information to enter discussion are multiplied 
by the number of group members.  (See also, Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994, for a 
similar analysis.) 
 The advantage to common information extends beyond what is mentioned in discussion.  
The extension of this advantage has been documented in several ways.  Groups are more likely to 
repeat common, than unique, information later in discussion (Stasser, et al., 1989; Larson et al., 
1996).  After discussion, members are more likely to correctly remember common, than unique, 
information that was mentioned during discussion (Stewart and Stasser, 1995).  Also, in written 
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summaries of their discussions, groups are more likely to include the common, than the unique, 
items (Stewart and Stasser, 1995). 
 This focus on common information does not necessarily imply that groups make bad 
decisions.  What is commonly known may, in fact, support the superior decision option.  
However, it is also possible that unique information, when pooled, may support options that are 
not supported by common information.  In these cases, discussions that focus on common 
information will lead to suboptimal decisions.  Hidden profiles are a class of decision problems 
that lead to suboptimal decisions when unique information is omitted or ignored during 
discussions. 
Hidden Profiles 
Research using hidden profile tasks illustrates the potential problems faced by groups who 
fail to mention critical pieces of unique information (Hollingshead, 1996; Stasser, Stewart, & 
Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser & Titus, 1985). In these studies 
experimenters distribute information among participants so that common information favors on 
balance one alternative and unique information favors a different, better alternative. It is only 
when substantial amounts of unique information are exchanged that the merits of the best 
alternative become obvious.  
One example of research using a hidden profile task is that of Stasser and Titus (1985). In 
this study, groups chose the best candidate for student council president from among three 
candidates. One of the three candidates was superior to the others (i.e., had more positive 
attributes than the other candidates had). Individuals who had access to all of the information 
selected the superior candidate 67% of the time prior to group discussion, and groups chose the 
superior candidate 83% of the time. In the hidden profile conditions, where individual group 
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members had access to partial information about the candidates, individuals selected the superior 
candidate 23% of the time prior to group discussion, and groups selected the superior candidate 
18% of time. In both conditions, all of the information was available to groups. However, in the 
hidden profile condition, some of the information that was critical to making an optimal decision 
was unshared among group members prior to discussion.  Groups discussion needed to pool the 
unique information to reveal the best alternative. 
In the above mentioned study and similar studies (Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser, 
Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Hollingshead, 1996; Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996) 
experimenters constructed controlled who got what information. Typically, studies on 
information sharing vary the degree of sharedness of information by distributing information sets 
among group members so that some information is common and other information is unique 
(given to only one member). Hence, the experimenters explicitly manipulate the sharedness of 
information. The current study examines information sharing in groups where the degree of 
sharedness of information arises more naturally as a result of information search patterns 
followed by group members. By studying the fate of unique information when the sharedness of 
information occurs more naturally, we hope to understand more about the social consequences of 
having and communicating unique information. 
Is it too risky to mention unique information? 
The CIS model provides one explanation for why groups are less likely to discuss unique 
information. Another reason may be that mentioning unique information is perceived as more 
risky. As suggested earlier, there may be some risk associated with bringing up a piece of unique 
information because there is no other person in the group who can verify its accuracy. This 
reasoning may account for why, in addition to the sampling bias favoring common information, 
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common information is more likely to be repeated and more likely to impact the group’s decision 
(Stasser, et. al., 1989; Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Kameda, T., Ohtsubo, Y., & Takezawa, M., 1997; 
Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999.).  
Of course, information is only useful to the group if it is reliable and accurate. Hence, 
there should be an implicit understanding among group members that information must be 
recalled accurately. One of the easiest ways to insure accuracy is to rely on multiple group 
members’ agreement about the veracity of a recalled item. When an item is unique, the individual 
who mentions the information stands alone in attesting to the item’s accuracy. 
In support of this line of reasoning, Parks and Cowlin (1996) found that unique 
information was more likely to be mentioned in groups when the databases of information were 
available during the decision-making process and, thus, the accuracy of the information could be 
checked. In this case, mentioning and repeating unique information was less risky, because there 
was an objective way of verifying the information.  
Can we infer to what is going on in board meetings from what is going on in the lab? 
 These insights into why groups can be reluctant to talk about and use unique information 
are largely based on experimental research. The question that we want to address is whether these 
processes are also evident in the teams that more representative of decision-makers in 
organizational contexts.  
As already noted, one feature of the experimental studies is that the sharedness of 
information is determined externally by the experimenter.  Some information is withheld from 
certain members whereas other information is presented to all members.  That is, information 
access is clearly and obviously controlled by the experimenter.  The laboratory studies often 
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justify this procedure to participants by suggesting that the distribution of information is 
controlled in this way in an attempt to simulate the diversity of information known by individuals 
in task groups outside of the laboratory. However, in organizational contexts, information is often 
available to all members of a decision making team.   Information is unevenly distributed in these 
groups due to variability in access to information as a result of their jobs, areas of expertise, 
proximity to information sources, and time constraints for accessing information. Of interest is 
whether or not the same bias for common information will be observed in groups where the 
experimenter or another external agent does not directly control access to information. 
Current Study 
The current study offers an opportunity to study information sharing in groups where 
access to information was not directly restricted by the experimenter. We analyzed archival data 
that was collected at the Center for Creative Leadership. These data were collected from groups 
of high-level, business executives working on a group decision making task. These executives 
reviewed information about four candidates for president of a division of a hypothetical 
company. Before they met as a group, executives worked individually at computer stations and 
accessed information via a computer menu. The information was presented to them on a menu 
where they could move freely from one piece of information to another and from one candidate 
to another. The menu presented choices for information on the candidates’ resumes, interviews, 
human resources files, others’ opinions, and an external search firm report. Within each of these 
categories there were sub-categories of information (e.g., job experience and education). Within 
each sub-category, participants were presented with specific information about a candidate (e.g., 
BA in business communication). A day after the individual searches, participants met as a group 
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to discuss and rank the candidates and develop, as a group, a list of the strengths and weaknesses 
for each candidate. 
In the current study, all of the information was available to each of the participants. 
However, due to time constraints and the large volume of information, members could not access 
all of the information. The sharedness of the information among members of a group varied to the 
degree to which individuals selected the same or different categories of information about the 
candidates. In this way, sets of common, partially shared, and unique information emerged due to 
different search strategies used by members. Of importance is that all of the information was 
available to every participant. Consequently, participants could select the types and items of 
information that they wanted to view.  
This situation suggests some interesting possibilities for the fate of unique information. 
Traditionally, unique information was arbitrarily denied to some individuals in the group by the 
experimenter. There was usually no a priori reason why one member should have access to the 
information and not others or why one piece of information was common while another was not. 
In the typical laboratory study, the sharedness of the information did not necessarily reveal 
something about the information – its importance, relevance or salience.  However, because the 
sharedness of information reflected actions taken by members in the current study, the sharedness 
could have indicated the perceived value or usefulness of the information among group members.  
Thus, common information may have been particularly impactful in these groups.   Conversely, 
unique information may have been valued due to a sense of ownership or personal investment 
that members felt for their uniquely held items. The participants in this study were high-level 
executives who presumably had experience making hiring decisions comparable to the one they 
made during the current simulation. Participants may have viewed revelations about unique 
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information as a way of underscoring their own expertise in this type of decision making task. 
Moreover, participants may have been more likely to discuss and repeat unique information than 
previous research would predict, due to their familiarity with the task. Parks and Cowlin (1996) 
showed that when a task is familiar to participants, unverifiable facts mentioned by one 
participant were more likely to be accepted than when the topic was unfamiliar.  Similarly, 
Wittenbaum (1998) found that members who had experience doing a task were more likely, than 
inexperienced members, to repeat unique information once it was mentioned during discussion.   
Thus, participants in the current study, who had a high degree of familiarity with the decision-
making task, may have been more proactive in promoting the dissemination and consideration of 
unique information. 
However, it is also possible that the bias for common information was enhanced in these 
groups. That is, whether information was common or unique may have had more social 
consequences when sharedness was a byproduct of personal choices than in contexts where an 
external agent controlled access to information. These participants may have viewed unique 
information as revealing their idiosyncratic information preferences and been more reluctant to 
promote the consideration of their uniquely-held items within the group. In short, the social risk 
of promoting unique information may have been enhanced in this context. 
Information Sampling 
 Information Sampling Hypothesis: Consistent with previous research, individuals are 
expected to mention more common information than unique information during group discussion.  
 In the current study there could be two possible mechanisms for the proposed effect that 
common information will be more likely to be mentioned than unique information. First, such an 
effect could be due to the collective sampling dynamics.  As predicted by the CIS model (Stasser 
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& Titus, 1987; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989), common information has a higher chance of 
being mentioned as more group members know it and can mention it. Second, because 
participants were familiar with the task and searched for information (rather than being provided 
with certain pieces of information), participants probably searched for types of information that 
were generally regarded as important. Moreover, groups probably discussed the types of 
information that were commonly seen as important for the task.  That is, shared perceptions of 
what was important information for making the decision may have guided information searches 
and subsequently shaped the content of discussions.   
 There are, however, features of the current study that may mute or eliminate the tendency 
to over sample common information in discussions.   For example, due to the executives’ 
familiarity with the type of task and the organizational context that was simulated, they may have 
actively searched for information that they thought others might overlook (Wittenbaum, Stasser, 
& Merry, 1996).  Having done so, they may have focused their contributions to discussion on 
information that made their contributions distinctive. 
Additionally, the bias for common information may be minimized when groups are 
required to rank order alternative rather than simply pick one. Research by Hollingshead (1996) 
found that groups who were instructed to rank order options were more likely to mention unique 
information than groups instructed to select the best alternative. She reasoned that rank ordering 
promotes more extensive discussion of the available information because rank ordering requires 
consideration of all decision alternatives. Hollingshead’s (1996) findings are relevant to the 
current study, because the groups studied here were asked to rank-order four alternatives. 
Because of these instructions, they may have discussed a greater portion of the unique 
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information than would be predicted from other research using instructions to choose a single 
best-alternative. 
Repetition of Information 
 We are also interested in how sharedness of information affects group members’ 
repetition of items once they are mentioned.  We considered two competing hypotheses regarding 
the repetition of information.  One is based on the empirical findings from laboratory research.  
The other is based on the unique nature of the CCL participants and the ownership of information 
that may have resulted from participants’ active information search. 
 Repetition Hypothesis A: Consistent with previous research, groups will repeat more 
common than unique information.  Stasser et al. (1989) and Larson, et al (1996) found that 
common items were repeated more than unique items, once they were mentioned.  This repetition 
effect has been explained in terms of social validation: the accuracy of unique information can 
not be validated by others in the group.  Others have suggested that previously encountered 
information is ascribed more importance than information acquired during discussion (e.g., 
Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Schulz-Hardt, & Greitemeyer, 2003). 
 Repetition Hypothesis B: Contrary to previous research, whereas common information 
may have a sampling advantage, groups will focus on unique items when they emerge and thus 
be more likely to repeat unique than common information.  Individuals actively acquired 
information in the current study, and they may have felt a sense of ownership for their unique 
items.   Thus, having mentioned an item that was new to others, they may have promoted its 
consideration.  Moreover, high status members (Larson et al., 1996), designated leaders (Larson 
et al., 1998) and members with task experience  (Wittenbaum 1998; Wittenbaum 2000) are more 
likely than others to repeat unique information.  Thus, given that members of the CCL groups 
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were top-level executives, they may have been more inclined than the typical member of a 
laboratory group to repeat items that were not widely shared before discussion.  
Listing Information 
 The executive teams listed strengths and weaknesses for each candidate at the end of their 
discussions.  Thus, we were able to analyze what groups mentioned during their discussions as 
well as what they decided to include on a collectively composed summary for each candidate. As 
with repetition, we entertained two form of the listing hypothesis.  The first is based on the 
typical finding with laboratory groups and the other one considers the unique character of the 
CCL participants. 
 Listing Hypothesis A: Consistent with previous research, groups will retain a larger 
proportion of common than unique information from their discussions on their written strengths 
and weaknesses sheets. Stewart and Stasser (1995) found that groups were less likely to record 
unique information than common information on their written profiles, again, presumably 
because other members could not verify the accuracy of unique information or because it was 
considered as less important. 
 Listing Hypothesis B: Contrary to previous findings, groups will retain a larger proportion 
of unique than common information from their discussions on their written strengths and 
weaknesses sheets.  As with the repetition of information, there are also reasons to expect that 
executives might not give an advantage to common information in their final solution. Stewart 
and Stasser (1995) found that when group members were explicitly assigned expertise for 
particular domains of information, less unique information was dropped from the group’s written 
protocol than was observed for groups without assignments of expertise. It is possible that in the 
current groups, participants perceived one another as experts in this type of decision- making task 
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due to their prior familiarity with similar decision-making tasks. If this is true, the group 
strengths and weaknesses sheets may reflect more unique information than would be expected 
from groups of non-experts. Moreover, if groups repeat more unique than common items as 
predicted in the Repetition Hypothesis B, this repetition may increase the likelihood that unique 
information will be salient and thus promote the inclusion of  more unique information on the 
written protocols  
Cognitive Centrality 
We were also interested in exploring the idea of cognitive centrality suggested by Kameda 
et al. (1997). Their conceptualization of cognitive centrality derived from a view of decision-
making groups as sociocognitive networks. They drew a parallel between social and cognitive 
networks and suggested that just as people share social links in a group, they also share cognitive 
links. Cognitive connections between group members can be measured in terms of how central 
individuals are in the cognitive network. People are more or less cognitively central to the degree 
to which they share information with other group members prior to discussion. A cognitively 
central member is someone whose knowledge is predominately shared with other members (i.e., 
has many information links to others) whereas a cognitively peripheral member knows mostly 
unique items (i.e., has few information links to others). Kameda et al. extended the idea of the 
greater influence of common information over unique information to the level of the member: 
they proposed that a member, who shares more information than another has greater influence in 
group discussion. Indeed, Kameda et al. (1997) showed that cognitively central members were 
more influential and participated more during the discussion. They suggested that, because group 
members prefer information that can be socially validated (i.e. common information), cognitively 
central members are more influential in groups. First, they can validate other people’s 
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information more often than peripheral members can. Second, others can validate most of the 
information that central members communicate. 
The idea of cognitive centrality ties in nicely with the hypothesis that sharing unique 
information carries some social risk. There may be some benefit to establishing the perception of 
oneself as cognitively central by mentioning common information in a group discussion. By 
building a reputation with one’s group members as someone who knows what they know, one 
creates a socially secure place for oneself in the group. Indeed, Kameda et al. (1997) suggested 
that cognitively central people acquire a reputation as credible sources and, once this reputation is 
established, they risk less when they do communicate unique information. 
In the current study, we examined how the discussants’ centrality to the cognitive network 
affected the degree to which they were successful in influencing the group to adopt their initial 
decision. Individual group members provided rankings of the alternatives before meeting as a 
group, and a comparison between these rankings and the group’s ranking  was used to derive a 
measure of influence.  
 Cognitive Centrality Hypothesis: Cognitively central members will be more influential in 
the group decision-making and participate more actively than cognitively peripheral members. 
Center for Creative Leadership 
As mentioned previously, the data for this study came from the Center for Creative 
Leadership (CCL). CCL offers top-level executives a course on leadership and decision-making 
styles. As part of the seminar, executives participated in the Peak Selection Simulation (PSS). 
One of the featured exercises in the PSS program was a small group decision-making task. 
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The data collected for the PSS provide an interesting opportunity to study small group 
decision-making. The paradigm used in the PSS is a good match with the paradigm that is often 
used in group decision-making research. Participants individually reviewed information about 
four candidates for the presidency of a division of a hypothetical company. The day following the 
computer searches of information, participants met in small groups. During the group meetings, 
they discussed the candidates, ranked ordered the candidates and then recorded the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the four candidates. Individuals had access to all of the information about 
all candidates during their pre-discussion computer searches; their information searches were 
only limited by the amount of time they had before they met with their groups. All of the 
participants in the PSS decision-making groups were top level executives. Most were probably 
familiar with making personnel decisions for top-level people in their companies.  
Method 
Overview of Study 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine information sharing patterns during 
discussion and how cognitive centrality affects influence processes in groups of business 
executives. To this end, we conducted internal analyses of individuals’ computer search strategies 
and examined the videotaped group discussions to investigate questions of information pooling 
processes and group decision-making. We also examined how the extent of overlap in members’ 
knowledge affected discussion and decision processes. 
Participants 
All of the participants took part in the PSS exercise as part of the CCL seminar in 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. A subset of 25 groups was selected from 80 groups who had 
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completed the PSS program.. CCL assigned an identification number to each group and recorded 
it on the videotaped discussion and the written protocol generated by the group. Initially, groups 
were eliminated from the sample if the paperwork and videotape labels did not match, as it was 
necessary to match written materials with the correct group videotape. From the groups that met 
that criterion, groups were selected to control for group size and gender composition of the 
groups. After this selection process, 33 groups remained. Finally, groups were dropped from the 
sample if their individual search data were incomplete. In the final sample, there were 25 groups 
with complete data. Fourteen of the groups had a least one woman, and group size ranged from 
four to six people. See Table 1 for the number of groups at each size and gender composition.  
________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_______________________ 
Stimulus Materials 
Before participants met at CCL, they received a packet of information about the PSS. The 
packet contained information about a hypothetical company, Looking Glass, Incorporated. and 
abbreviated resumes for four candidates for the presidency of the Advanced Products Division of 
the company . During the PSS, participants viewed information about the job candidates 
individually at a computer station. The information was presented through a series of menus 
representing the different types of information available about each candidate. Interview 
questions and answers, a resume, solicited and unsolicited opinions, and a search form report was 
available for each candidate. Three of the four candidates were internal to the company and also 
had human resource information. 
The CCL designed the information so that it would closely mimic the type of information 
executives would expect to have in a real hiring situation, and it included positive and negative 
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attributes for each candidate. CCL asked experts in the field to review the profiles and rank the 
candidates. The expert solution ranked the candidates from best to worst.  Each candidate had 
roughly the same number of screens of information. There was no systematic attempt to balance 
strengths and weaknesses for each candidate across the various sources of information. 
Procedure 
Participants viewed a brief videotaped message from an actor portraying the CEO of 
Looking Glass, Inc., outlining the group’s task. After viewing the videotape, individuals began 
their computer searches of the candidate information. After 60 minutes, participants rank ordered 
their preferences for the four candidates. Then, the computer displayed a message that advised 
participants that they had completed the computer search portion of the PSS. They were 
instructed not to speak to anyone about their computer search until the small group discussion. 
During the computer search, the computer recorded the name and gender of the participants and 
the participants’ rankings. The computer also recorded which screens of information were 
accessed, in what order, and how long an individual looked at each screen. 
Participants met with their groups in a small room with a round table. The rooms had a 
large tablet of paper on one wall, a video camera in one corner on the ceiling, and a one-way 
mirror along one wall. All of the participants were aware that they were being videotaped as well 
as observed from a one-way mirror along one side of the room. A facilitator instructed the 
participants to discuss the candidates, rank order them as a group, and record strengths and 
weaknesses for each candidate as a group.  
Coding Scheme 
Information Sharing and Cognitive Centrality 21 
The coding scheme is divided into two categories: action codes and information codes. 
The action codes were developed to capture the nature of the discussants’ communications 
throughout the discussion. Codes represent actions such as stating a preference for a candidate, 
agreeing with another discussant, etc. The information codes were designed to code for the actual 
pieces of information that individuals mentioned about the candidates. 
In order to construct the information codes, numerical codes were assigned to the roughly 
400 pieces of information developed by CCL for the four candidates. The codes were constructed 
to capture the hierarchical nature of the way in which the information was presented to the 
subjects via a computer menu. The information was available to subjects through a menu that 
contained large categories of information (e.g., Resume, HR information, Interview, etc.). Within 
each of those larger categories were sub-categories of information (e.g., Work history, Job 
approach, Education). Finally, each computer screen under a sub-category presented specific 
pieces of information (e.g., BA in business communication). The information codes were 
designed to retain as much information as participants might provide about the exact source and 
content of the information that s/he mentioned from the menu. For example, if a speaker said, 
“On Cooper’s resume, under job experience, it said that he worked in Hungary,” coders recorded 
a code that indicated a speaker referenced the resume (specifically, the job experience section) 
and the specific information code for working in Hungary. Alternatively, if a speaker only said, 
“Cooper worked in Hungary,” it was coded for the specific information code for working in 
Hungary with ‘0’ indicating no reference to where the information was accessed. 1 
 Six coders, blind to the hypotheses, were trained over a period of several weeks. During 
training, the coders coded parts of several videotapes. The coders met with the experimenter and 
with each other to discuss questions about the codes and to reach a mutual understanding of the 
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codes. Throughout the time that the coders were individually coding tapes, they continued to 
meet with an experimenter and each other weekly to answer questions and clarify their shared 
understanding of the codes. Nine of the tapes were coded by a second coder in order to provide a 
basis for estimating coder reliability.  The two independent coders agreed 92% of the time on the 
presence and absence items of information in these nine discussion tapes.  
The same set of coders also coded the written strengths and weakness lists that the groups 
produced at the end of their discussions.  In order to estimate coder reliability, six of the lists 
were coded independently by two people. The two independent coders agreed 98% of the time on 
the presence and absence items of information in these six written protocols.   
Dependent Variables 
Individual and Group Rankings. After individuals completed their information search of 
the computer data base, they were prompted to rank the four candidates. In addition to these 
rankings, each group ranked the four candidates at the end of their discussions. These individual 
rankings were compared to the group rankings and to the expert solution to assess members’ 
influence and correctness, respectively. 
Information Pooling. The videotapes were coded for information that was mentioned 
during the group discussion. The coding system allowed us to record where the information was 
accessed (i.e., from which information source) as well as the actual content of the information. 
The information pooling analyses were conducted using the most specific level expressed by the 
information codes (e.g., “Cooper worked in Hungary”). Information was coded for the number of 
times each piece of information was mentioned and by whom. To capture the sharedness of 
information, information was coded as unique, partially shared, or totally shared. Information 
accessed during the computer search by only one member of a group was designated unshared; 
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information accessed by more than one but not all members was designated as partially shared; 
and information accessed by all members was designated as shared. 
 Cognitive Centrality.  Each individual received a cognitive centrality score. This score 
was calculated as in Kameda et al. (1997). The centrality score for each Member i, Ci, is given 
by: 

=
′=
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where j  i, n is group size, and B is a member (row) by information item (column) matrix. Each 
row of this matrix corresponds to a member and each column to an information item.  If member 
i looked at item j the entry cij = 1; otherwise, cij = 0. To construct this matrix, we determined 
which screens each individual member of the group accessed to determine which members 
viewed each item of information. The centrality score captures both the number of information 
links one shares with others in the group and the number of people with whom one shares these 
information links. In short, a high cognitive centrality score indicates multiple information links 
with other members whereas a low centrality score indicates that much of a member’s 
information is not known by others. 
 Participation Rates. As participation rates have been used as a measure for influence 
(Bottger, 1984; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992), we decided to use these rates too for that mean. 
Participation rates were based on the total number of codable utterances each person made during 
the discussion. Of interest to the current analyses is how cognitive centrality and correctness are 
related to participation.  
Results 
Information Sampling 
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 Information was categorized as unique (one member viewed it), partially shared (two or 
more, but not all, members viewed it), and common (all members viewed it).  On average, a 
group’s members collectively accessed a total of 316 items in their information search.  Most of 
those items (187) were accessed by two or more, but not all, group members (partially shared). 
On average, 44 items were accessed by only one member (unshared), and an average of 85 items 
were accessed by all group members (shared).  The analyses of discussion content were based on 
the proportions of items that at least one member accessed.  That is, a group could only discuss 
an item if at least one member accessed it.  Across all levels of sharedness, participants 
mentioned only 8.7% of information that was looked at by at least one member of the group prior 
to discussion.  That is, groups discussed, on average, about 27 items of information about the 4 
candidates. 
 A one-way ANOVA using level of information sharedness as a repeated measure factor 
was conducted on the proportions of information mentioned during discussion. There was a 
significant main effect for the level of sharedness, F(2, 48)= 41.19, p<.000l. A Tukey test 
revealed that an item of information was significantly more likely to be mentioned during 
discussion if it was common (M=.127, SD=.058) than if it was partially shared (M=.083, 
SD=.032), p<.05.  Moreover, partially shared information was mentioned significantly more 
often than unique information, (M=.037, SD=.034), p<.05. 
Information Repetition 
 The proportions of information repeated at least once after being mentioned were also 
analyzed in a one-way ANOVA using level of information sharedness as a repeated measure 
factor. This analysis showed the same pattern as above. There was a significant main effect for 
the level of sharedness, F(2, 48)= 20.03, p<.0001.  A Tukey test showed that an item was 
significantly more likely to be discussed more than once, if it was common (M=.044, SD=.033) 
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than if it was partially shared (M=.023 SD=.016), p<.05.  Additionally, partially shared 
information was repeated significantly more often than unique information, (M=.008, SD=.012), 
p<.05. 
 The foregoing analyses were based on the proportion of items that were repeated relative 
to the total number of items looked at by at least one group member.  It is also informative to 
examine the proportion of mentioned items that were repeated.  That is, the subsequent analysis 
divides the number of repeated items by the number mentioned during discussion, rather than by 
the number originally accessed by the group’s members.  Because 6 groups did not mention any 
of the unique items, the proportion of mentioned unique items that were repeated is undefined for 
these groups.  Thus, only 19 groups could be included in this analysis if all levels of sharedness 
were included.  However, for these 19 groups, identical proportions of mentioned unique 
(M=.26) and partially shared items (M= .26) were repeated.  Thus, we combined the unique and 
partially shared categories in this analysis to enable us to include all 25 groups.  All common 
items that were mentioned were more likely to be repeated (M=.36) than were items not initially 
accessed by all members (M= .26), F(1, 24)=4.07, p=.05.  This result indicates that once a 
member mentioned an item, the item was more likely to be repeated if all members had accessed 
it during their information search than if some did not access it.  
Information Listing  
 The proportions of information accessed by the group that were included on the written 
strengths and weakness protocols were analyzed in a one-way ANOVA using information 
sharedness as a repeated measure factor. Once again, there was a significant main effect for the 
level of sharedness, F(2, 48)=22.74, p<.0001.  A Tukey test showed that an item was 
significantly more likely to be included on the list if it was common (M=.025, SD=.014) than if it 
was partially shared (M=.014, SD=.013), p<.05.   Furthermore, partially shared information was 
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significantly more likely to be included on the list than unique information (M= .004, SD=.009), 
p<.05. 
 These results are based on proportions of items that were listed relative to the total 
number of items accessed by at least one group member. Consequently, as with the repetition 
data, the foregoing analysis does not directly assess the proportions of items actually mentioned 
during discussion that were retained on the strengths and weaknesses lists. Adjusting for the 
numbers mentioned, resulted in the loss of the same 6 groups as with the repetition analysis.  
However, for the 19 groups with complete data on this dependent measure, similar proportions of 
mentioned unique (M=.20) and partially shared items (M= .18) were listed as strengths and 
weaknesses.  Thus, as with the repetition analysis, we combined the unique and partially shared 
categories in this analysis to enable us to include all 25 groups.  However, for listed items, 
sharedness was related to the proportion of mentioned items that were retained on the list 
although the effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 24)=3.13, p<.1.   The trend was in the 
direction of a mentioned item being more likely to be included in the list if it was common 
(M=.23) than if it was not completely common (M=.16).    
 Summary. These results support our Information Sampling Hypothesis: the likelihood that 
individuals would mention an item increased when more people knew it prior to discussion. 
These results are consistent with much of the previous research in the information sampling 
literature (e.g., Stasser et al, 1989; Larson, et al., 1996).   There was also partial support for the 
Repetition Hypothesis A in that common information was more likely to be repeated once it was 
mentioned than was unique and partially shared information. However, we found no difference 
between partially shared and unique information in terms of repetition during discussion. There 
was limited support of our Listing Hypothesis A in that common information, which was 
mentioned during group discussion, was more likely to be retained on the strength and 
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weaknesses lists than was unique and partially shared information although this effect was only 
marginally significant. 
Normative Value of Information 
 Due to the unique participant pool and their familiarity with the type of task, we suspected 
that a collective information sampling process due to the numbers of members accessing items 
might not be the only factor affecting discussion content.  Both the likelihood that group 
members accessed an item and then later discussed it might be due to the perceived relevance or 
importance of the item to the decision task.  To test the idea that members may have a script or an 
interview model guiding their selections, we examined the computer search data for 576 CCL 
participants whose groups were not included in this study because of missing data.   For each 
item, we computed the proportion of these participants who accessed the item during their 
computer search.  This proportion was used as an indicator of the normative understanding about 
an item’s perceived relevance or usefulness in the population of participants from which groups 
were composed.  We computed the average normativeness of shared, partially shared, and unique 
information for each group. A one-way ANOVA where information sharedness was a repeated 
measure was conducted on these normativeness values, and a significant main effect for 
information sharedness emerged, F(2, 48)=1291.93, p<.0001. A Tukey test showed that common 
information was significantly more normative (M=.85, SD=.029) than partially shared 
information (M=.60, SD=.028), p<.05.  Likewise, partially shared information was more 
normative than unique information (M=.30, SD=.054), p<.05.  Thus, not surprisingly, 
normativeness was strongly related to whether information was viewed by one, two or more, or 
all group members during their information search.  This raises the possibility that the number of 
a group’s members accessing an item is only a proxy for the normativeness and normativeness of 
information determines the likelihood that it will be discussed.  In the traditional laboratory study 
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of collective information sampling, this potential confound is removed by experimental control of 
access to information.  
 In order to further investigate the role of information normativeness, we conducted a 
series of multilevel regressions (Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002) to predict 
whether items were mentioned, repeated and included on the strengths and weakness lists.  In 
these analyses, information items were treated as nested in the group.  To predict whether an item 
was mentioned, we restricted the set of items with each group to those that accessed by at least 
one member of the group during the information search.  For each item, we used the following 
predictors: the proportion of group members who accessed the item (sharedness) and the 
proportion of other CCL participants who also accessed the item (normativeness).  For group 
level predictors, we computed the mean sharedness and mean normativeness of all items in the 
set accessed by at least on group member.  In the regression including the item level predictor of 
sharedness and the group level predictor of average sharedness of items, sharedness was a 
significant predictor of mentioning, F(1, 7878)= 99.81, p< .0001.  Similarly, in the regression 
using normativeness as the item level predictor and average normativeness of all items accessed 
by the group, normativeness  was a significant predictor of mentioning, F(1, 7878)= 144.42, p< 
.0001.   When both item sharedness and normativeness (and their corresponding group level 
predictors) were entered in the regression simultaneously, only normativeness significantly 
predicted mentioning, F(1, 7877)= 44.84, p< .0001.  In the presence of normativeness, sharedness 
was not a significantly predictive, F(1, 7877)= 0.79, ns..  The information mentioned during 
discussion seemingly reflected the perceived importance of the information in the population of 
CCL participants and the number of members of each group who accessed an item was related to 
the  likelihood that it would be mentioned only because group level sharedness was related to the 
overall normativeness of an item.  Thus, even though our Information Sampling Hypothesis was 
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supported, the underlying process was quite different than is the case for the typical laboratory 
study of information sampling in decision making groups. 
 A similar series of multilevel regressions were conducted to predict whether mentioned 
items were repeated.  However, in these analyses, only the set of items mentioned at least once 
during the discussion were included, not the entire set accessed during the computer search by a 
group’s members.  This restriction on the set of items considered is due to the fact that an item 
could not be repeated if it was not mentioned.  In the regression including the item level predictor 
of sharedness and the group level predictor of average sharedness of items, sharedness was a 
significant predictor of whether an item was repeated once mentioned, F(1, 668)= 8.79, p< .004.  
Similarly, in the regression using normativeness as the item level predictor and average 
normativeness of all items accessed by the group, normativeness  was a marginally significant 
predictor of mentioning, F(1, 667)= 3.66, p< .06.   When both item sharedness and normativeness 
(and their corresponding group level predictors) were entered in the regression simultaneously, 
only sharedness significantly predicted mentioning, F(1, 665)= 5.36, p<.03.  In the presence of 
sharedness, normativeness was not a significantly predictive, F(1, 664)= 0.26, ns..  Whereas 
normativeness predicted whether an item would be mentioned, sharedness predicted whether it 
would be repeated once mentioned.  The more members who had accessed an item during their 
computer search, the more likely it would be repeated once it was mentioned.  This finding 
supports Repetition Hypothesis A: sharedness promotes the repetition of items once they are 
introduced into discussion. 
 We also conducted a series of multilevel regressions to predict whether a discussed item 
would be included on the strengths and weaknesses lists.  We also considered repetition as a 
potential predictor because preliminary analyses showed that a higher proportion (.29) of items 
that were repeated during discussion were included in the lists than items that were mentioned 
Information Sharing and Cognitive Centrality 30 
but not repeated (.14), 2 (1, N=694) = 22.4, p< .0001.   Both sharedness and normativeness (in 
the presence of their respective group level averages) by themselves were significant predictors, 
F(1, 670)= 2.15, p<.04, and F(1, 670)= 2.25, p<.03, respectively.  However, when repetition was 
included as a predictor, neither sharedness nor normativeness were significant predictors, F(1, 
668)= 0.07, ns., and F(1, 668)= 1.12, ns., respectively.  However, in the regression including all 
predictors, repetition during discussion remained highly predictive of inclusion on an item on the 
final list, F(1, 665)= 22.47, p<.0001. 
 Figure 1 summarizes the results of these regressions and includes the significant 
standardized regression weights and their standard errors.  As the figure illustrates, normativeness 
predicted whether an item would be mentioned during discussion but the number of group 
members who accessed the item predicted whether it would be repeated once it was mentioned.   
Neither sharedness nor normativeness had a direct influence on the retention of an item on the 
strength and weakness list compiled at the end of discussion.  However, repeated items were 
much more likely to be included than items that were not repeated during discussion. This pattern 
of findings suggests that the apparent influence of sharedness on the inclusion of an item on a list 
was mediated by repetition. 
______________________ 
Include Figure 1 here 
_____________________ 
 
Cognitive Centrality  
 The cognitive centrality hypothesis predicted that cognitively central members would be 
more influential in the group. Cognitive centrality scores were calculated for each group member 
based on the formula given in Kameda et al. (1997) and described earlier. The mean cognitive 
centrality score for an individual in this sample is 654, SD=137. One can think of this index as 
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representing the number of information links between a member and the rest of the group. 
 In order to assess the relationship between cognitive centrality and influence during 
discussion, an influence score was computed based on the distance between individuals’ pre-
discussion ranking and their group’s final ranking of the candidates.  This influence could take on 
values from ‘0’ to ‘10.’ A score of ‘10’ indicates no difference between the individual and the 
group ranking, and a ‘0’ indicates that the group’s ranking was the inverse of the individual’s 
original ranking. The mean influence score for an individual in this sample is 7.5, SD=2.23, 
indicating that group rankings were relatively close to the typical member’s ranking. 
 Group rankings were closer to the expert solution (M = 8.38, SD=1.93) than were the 
members' initial rankings (M = 7.31, SD=1.19), F(1, 23) = 7.92, p < .01. As a result, members 
whose initial ranking was close to the expert solution would appear to be influential.  Indeed, 
being correct may have enhanced one’s influence but we wanted to control for correctness in 
evaluating the relationship of cognitive centrality and influence.  Thus, we also computed a 
correctness index for each member.  The index was computed like the influence index except it 
was based on the ranking contained in the expert solution, rather than the group’s ranking.   As 
with the influence score, the correctness score could vary from ‘0’ to ‘10.’  A ‘10’ indicates that 
an individual’s ranking was identical to the expert solution and a ‘0’ indicates that the 
individual’s ranking was the inverse of the expert solution.  
 In order to investigate the effect of cognitive centrality on influence, we conducted a 
series of multilevel regressions.  In these analyses, members were nested within groups.  For each 
member, we used the following predictors: cognitive centrality and closeness of the member’s 
initial ranking to the expert solution (correctness).  For group level predictors, we computed the 
mean centrality and mean correctness for other members of the group.   In the regression 
including member centrality and the group level predictor of average centrality of others, member 
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centrality was a positively related to influence, F(1, 107)= 25.80, p< .0001.  Additionally, the 
average centrality of others in the group was negatively related to influence, F(1, 98.8)= 13.34, 
p< .001.  That is, a member was influential to the degree that s/he was cognitively central and the 
remaining members of the group were not.  In the regression using correctness as the member 
level predictor and average correctness of the others in the group as the group level predictor, 
only correctness  was a significant predictor of influence, F(1, 123)= 32.13, p< .0001.   When 
both cognitive centrality and correctness (and their corresponding group level predictors) were 
entered in the regression simultaneously, both remained significant predictors of influences, F(1, 
104)= 13.16, p< .001 and F(1, 121)= 18.78, p< .0001.  Additionally, the average centrality of the 
other members was also still negatively related to influence, F(1, 106)= 4.67, p< .04.  The 
implication is that cognitively central members were more influential in moving the group toward 
their initial solution than were their more cognitively peripheral peers.  It also helped if the 
member’s initial solution was close to the expert solution and other members of the group were 
relatively cognitively peripheral. 
 We considered the possibility that the individuals who accessed more information had 
higher centrality scores (i.e., more informational overlap with other simply by virtue of having 
more information) and were more influential.   However, when the total amount of information 
accessed was added to the regression model for predicting influence, it was not a significant 
predictor, F(1, 106)= 0.76, ns, and member centrality, average group centrality and member 
correctness remained significant predictors. Figure 2 summarizes these findings and  includes 
the significant standardized regression weights and their standard errors.  
_________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
________________________ 
 
 Participation rates are often used as an index of influence for group members (Bottger, 
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1984; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992). We measured participation by counting the total number of 
codable utterances for each individual and used this measure as another gauge of influence. The 
mean amount of participation for an individual in this sample was 98.22, SD=27.40. We 
correlated our index of group influence (the distance between an individuals’ ranking and the 
group ranking) with participation rates. The mean correlation between participation and group 
influence across all groups (M = -.01; SD = .35) was not significantly different from 0, t(22)=-
.20, p = .84. It does not appear that group members were influential due to high participation 
rates.  The mean correlations across groups between participation and correctness (M =-.04, 
SD=.35) and participation and centrality (M=.03, SD=.30) were likewise not significantly 
different from 0, t(23)=-.57,  p=.58 and t(23)=.46, p=.64, respectively. 
 Thus, the cognitive centrality hypothesis received strong support. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, cognitively central members were more influential than peripheral members. 
Cognitively central members did not, however, participate more than cognitively peripheral 
members did, which was contrary to the hypothesis and contrary to Kameda et al.’s findings 
(1997). 
Discussion 
The purposes of this study were to examine the generalizability of laboratory research on 
information sharing to a high-fidelity, hiring task embedded in a hypothetical organizational 
context and to look at the impact of cognitive centrality in group decision-making. To this end, 
we conducted internal analyses of data collected from groups of executives who completed a 
hiring exercise in a leadership training course.  
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Information Sampling 
Unshared information had a similar fate in this sample as in previous research on 
information sampling (Stasser & Titus, 1985; 1987; Stasser, et al., 1989; Stewart & Stasser, 
1995): unique information was less likely to be mentioned than common information. However, 
these results suggest that unique information was less likely to be mentioned for reasons that are 
different from those suggested by previous research. Larson et al. (1994) and Stasser and Titus 
(1987; see also, Larson et al. , 1996; Stasser et al., 1989; ) argued that unique information suffers 
from a sampling disadvantage. They showed that information that is known to only one person 
prior to group discussion is less likely, due to collective sampling dynamics, to be mentioned 
during discussion. 
The sampling disadvantage aside, it was reasoned that a number of variables in the current 
study might enhance the likelihood that executives would mention unique information. The 
participants in this study were familiar with hiring decisions, and they rank ordered the options, 
both of which can lead to more mentioning of unique information. Furthermore, it was reasoned 
that the social consequences of mentioning unique information in this sample may have been 
positive, as they could have been seen as a way of disclosing one’s own expertise; and this may 
have led to more unique information coming out during discussions. Finally, in the current study, 
information was not differentially distributed among the executives prior to their group 
discussions. The sharedness of the information differed to the extent to which participants 
selected it during their information search.  Nonetheless, evidence for the bias favoring the 
discussion of  common information still emerged.  
It appears that part of the explanation for the information sampling patterns in the current 
study is the social importance of selecting particular bits of information. Common information 
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was more normative than partially shared information, which was more normative than unique 
information. This suggests that there was a subset of information that was popular with the CCL 
participants.  That is, there seemed to a socially shared perspective that some types of information 
were more important or relevant in making the hiring decision (Tindale & Kameda, 2000). Thus, 
normativeness not only predicted whether an item was mentioned during group discussion but 
also predicted how many members of each group were likely to access the information during 
their computer search. 
 Executives in this study appeared to have selected information in a way that created 
common information that was socially valued. It seems that there was a set of information that 
people in this population (i.e., business executives) implicitly agreed a priori was important for 
making a hiring decision. Unique information may have remained unshared due in part to the fact 
that it was viewed as less important to the group’s task. Therefore, the “naturally” occurring 
variability in the sharedness of information may have indeed had social consequences. However, 
they were different from what was anticipated. It seems that there is implicit understanding 
among the executives of how such a hiring task should be resolved. Consequently, looking for 
and bringing into discussion information items that are not part of “the” solution does not, as 
speculated, reveal something about one’s own expertise, but might rather be seen as evidence that 
a person is not familiar with the socially accepted way of solving the task. It was reasoned that 
allowing the variability in information’s sharedness to emerge somewhat naturally would 
facilitate mentioning of unique information. However, the executives in this study were still more 
likely to mention common information during discussion. 
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Repetition of Information 
 Also, in terms of repetition of information, we obtained a finding that is consistent with 
patterns of discussion repetition that has been observed in previous research: Common 
information was more likely to be repeated once it was mentioned than was unique and partially 
shared information.  
The question that arises is whether that could have been due to the normativeness of the 
mentioned items. However, normativeness did not predict which items were repeated.  To the 
contrary, the number of group members who accessed the item before discussion (sharedness) 
predicted whether an item was repeated. Apparently information was not repeated because 
participants were attuned to what was the normatively acceptable information. It seems rather to 
be the case that once a piece of information was mentioned, it gained more weight and credibility 
if more than one member knew it before discussion. This finding is consistent with what was 
found and proposed by Stasser, et al. (1989) and by Stewart and Stasser (1995). They showed 
that common information, once it has been mentioned, is more likely to be repeated during group 
discussions. They suggested that this tendency to repeat common information may be because 
group members can validate the accuracy of common information, and groups have more 
confidence in common information, because more group members can validate it (see also 
Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz (1996); Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman (1999)). That 
is, groups tend to repeat information in which they are most confident.  
However, Stewart and Stasser (1995) also reasoned that personal expertise might serve as 
validation for unique information and increase repetition of unique items. That is, if an expert 
mentions unique information, it need not be validated by other members of the group. The notion 
that groups in the current study might tend to focus on unique information, once it was mentioned 
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during the discussion, came from the idea that group members from this population might be seen 
by one another as experts at this type of task. We found however the opposite: even the 
executives were more likely to repeat items that were widely-shared by a group’s members 
before discussion. 
Another reason for repeating common information may be due to a rehearsal effect.  This 
explanation was originally suggested by Stasser et al. (1989) but has not been systematically 
examined.  However, given the large amount of information that the participants in the current 
hiring simulation had available, the memory load was undoubtedly high.  Moreover, discussion 
occurred a day after the executive completed their computer searches.  Thus, if they had not 
accessed an item in their computer search but heard it mentioned during discussion, this brief 
exposure may have not been sufficient to ensure later recall even if the item was relevant to later 
discussion.   However, if they had accessed it during their computer search and then heard it 
again during discussion, this additional exposure may have been sufficient to increase the item’s 
availability during subsequent discussion.  Thus, such a rehearsal effect could give common 
information an advantage over unique information even if both were seen as equally valid. 
Retention of Information on Written Summary 
As for the retention of information, our reasoning concerning the predictions resembles 
the ones for repetition of information. Based on past findings, we hypothesized that common 
information had a higher chance to end up on a written protocol than unique information. The 
rationale for this prediction is again based on the need for social validation of the contributed 
information. For unique information, social validation is impossible, by definition, as no other 
member knows the information. In Stewart and Stasser’s study (1995) explicit expertise 
assignments decreased the amount of unique information that was dropped from the group’s 
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written protocol. Thus, in this earlier study, it appeared that, in lieu of social validation, expert 
recall of unique information was trusted as accurate.  
We found weak support for the hypothesis that common information was more likely to 
be retained on the strength and weakness lists than was unique and partially shared information. 
The effect of sharedness on the process leading to the retention of information on the written 
summaries is, however, indirect.  Repetition of information during discussion, not the sharedness 
nor the normativeness of information, directly predicted whether an item was retained on the 
written record.   Normativeness had only a distal, indirect effect in that it predicted what was 
mentioned during discussion.  Sharedness had a more proximal, but still indirect, effect in that it 
predicted what items were repeated.  This pattern suggests that information that was repeated was 
salient to the group members at the time that they completed the strengths and weakness list.  
Moreover, it is possible that the shear repetition made the information seem more credible and 
important. 
 However this should not be taken as an indication that group members did not see each 
other as experts, as we cannot say that the effect would not have been stronger within a 
comparison group, consisting for example of undergraduates. But it shows that even business 
executives do not give equal weight to bits of information in their final decision, irrespective of 
how many other group members had previously accessed the information. Information that is 
repeatedly discussed clearly has an advantage.  
In sum, an implicit normative understanding about what types of information are relevant 
for a task was important in determining what information was brought up during group 
discussion. But beyond shaping the initial content of discussion, normativeness did not have an 
impact. What information was repeated during group discussion was related to how many 
Information Sharing and Cognitive Centrality 39 
members accessed it before discussion.  What kind of information ended up on the summary list, 
presumably reflecting what was deemed important and supportive of their final decision, was 
shaped by the things that were repeated.  Thus, in an important way, how many members of a 
group accessed an item during their individual information searches, affected the likelihood that 
the item would be retained on the final written record.  
Cognitive Centrality 
Kameda et al. (1997) introduced the idea of cognitive centrality. They proposed that 
people can be linked to one another in a cognitive network of common knowledge. They found 
evidence that cognitively central people are more influential and participate more in groups. 
In the current study, we also found that member centrality was positively related to 
influence, while the average centrality of other group members was negatively related to 
influence. This effect of centrality was not due to central member’s being more correct. 
Nonetheless, correctness was also positively related to influence. We could show that a 
cognitively central member was influential, and that such a person was even more influential 
when his/her initial solution was close to the expert solution, and when other group members 
were not cognitively central. One should imagine a person, who shared a lot of cognitive links 
with many other group members, but most of the other group members shared mainly cognitively 
links with that person. The structure of the cognitive links of an influential person within a group 
can easily remind us of a manager, who has several experts for different areas working for her. 
All experts report to the manager about their field, however they do not have much 
communication between each other about their area of expertise. In that case the manager is 
cognitively central as she shares a lot of cognitive links with many others in her team. However 
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the other team members are all relatively peripheral as they share cognitive links mainly with the 
manager. 
Whereas cognitive centrality increased influence among these executive, it was not 
related to higher participation during group discussion.  There was virtually no correlation 
between participation rates and cognitive centrality or between participation rates and 
correctness. Further, participation was not correlated with group influence. Although this is a null 
finding, it is interesting in its own right. It is inconsistent with a general well known cynical 
attitude that influence can be due to simply talking a lot. Moreover, it suggests that what was said 
was more important than how much was said in these executive teams.  This finding is 
inconsistent with other research that has shown that people use participation rates as an indication 
of correctness or degree of expertise (e.g., Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992). But perhaps, high-level 
business executives have learned to focus more on the quality than the quantity of contributions 
to judge competence and expertise. As participation was not related to correctness in the current 
study, the executives were well served to ignore talkativeness as a heuristic cue for competence.  
It is also important to note that the current study used participation rates that were based 
on a relatively objective measure from a third party coder. Often research on participation uses 
group members’ estimates of participation as an index of participation (e.g., Kameda et al., 1997; 
Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992). It is possible that people who were influential in the current groups 
were perceived as high participators, when in fact they were not. If participants had ranked one 
another’s participation, as they did in Kameda et al.’s study (1997), they may have ranked central 
and correct people high relative to others regardless of their actual participation rates. 
Implications for Information Pooling 
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One reason for delegating decisions to groups is that group discussion provides a means 
of pooling the diverse information of its members and, thus, a group’s decision is more informed 
than a decision made by any one of the members.  The benefits of information pooling are 
compromised if members discuss primarily information that they shared in common before 
discussion.  Pooling is critical to good decision making when the information supporting a 
superior choice is largely unique before discussion as in hidden profiles.  In a hidden profile task, 
the superiority of the best option will not be discovered if unique information is not mentioned 
during discussion. 
Information access was not controlled in the hiring task completed by the executive teams 
in the PSS program.  Thus, there was no attempt to construct a hidden profile.  However, it is 
reasonable to ask if these executive teams would have been more successful at discovering a 
hidden profile than the typical laboratory group.  The answer is seemingly that they would not. 
The best predictor of whether an item of information was mentioned during the 
discussions of these executive teams was how often the item was accessed by people who were 
not members of the teams.  Thus, discussions contained primarily information that was accessed 
by the majority of individuals in the population from which teams were composed.  Items that 
were accessed by relatively few were unlikely to emerge in discussions.  Thus, if information that 
supported a superior choice were accessed by relatively few people, group discussions would not 
typically include this information.  In this case, groups would end up selecting the choice that 
was supported by widely-accessed information.  The conclusion is: Whatever is commonly 
known before group discussion is amplified in the contents of discussion, and the choice 
supported by what is commonly known will likely be the group’s choice.  In short, our results 
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suggest that group discussions amplify common information and do not effectively pool unique 
information. 
The finding that cognitively central members were more influential adds another layer of 
evidence that group choice is an effective mechanism for identifying options that are supported 
by common information.  Stated simply, the influence of a member is enhanced if she shares a lot 
of information with other members.  Members who bring diverse information to the group will be 
cognitively peripheral, and their influence will be compromised.   That is, having different 
information than others in a group decreased the ability to persuade others to adopt one’s 
solution.  Thus, unique information was not a valued commodity but was a liability. 
Stasser & Birchmeier (2003) suggested that one way to enhance the consideration of 
uncommon or unique information is to assign members expert roles.  They noted that assigned 
expertise increased the mentioning and repetition of unique information in laboratory groups 
(Stasser et al., 1995, 2000; Stewart and Stasser, 1995).   We suggested earlier that the CCL 
executives may have viewed each other as experts.  However, the key may not be expertise per 
se, but differentiated roles.   First, expert roles would allow members to focus their contributions 
on unique information associated with their role and increase the likelihood that uniquely-held 
information would emerge during discussion.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, unique 
information from a recognized expert is credible.  In the current study, the CCL setting took 
participants out of their organizational context and muted cues that may have signaled differing 
and perhaps complementary domains of expertise.  An open question is whether a setting that 
reinforced rather then obscured expert roles may have yielded different findings. For example, 
would cognitive centrality be an asset for promoting one’s position if the person were labeled an 
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expert?  After all, “experts” are expected to know things that others do not and, at least to some 
degree, be cognitively peripheral. 
We also noted that  high status members (Larson et al., 1996), designated leaders (Larson 
et al., 1998) and members with task experience  (Wittenbaum 1998; Wittenbaum 2000) are more 
likely than others to repeat unique information.    It is important to note that in the experimental 
studies, members of a group were different in terms of status, leadership and task experience.  For 
example, in Wittenbaum (1998), some members had experience with the task and others did not 
within each group.   In this social situation, the experienced members were more likely than the 
inexperienced ones to repeat unique information.  If a group had been composed of all 
experienced members, it is not clear that they would have been more likely than a group of all 
inexperienced members to repeat unique information.  That is, it may not be the characteristics of 
the participants, per se, but the nature of their relationships with one another that is important. 
 But looking at decision making groups in real life, it is less likely that they would consist 
of experts and non-experts making a decision about issues that fall within the area of expertise of 
one or more of the group members. The most important decision making groups in real life 
consist of experts only. Think of the board of a company, the Federal Open Market Committee of 
the Federal Reserve Bank, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, all small groups 
consisting of experts of equally high status, who make decisions that vastly influence our 
economy and consequently to a great deal our economic well-being. For this sort of real life 
decision making groups, the results of the current study have relevant implications. Because 
members of the executive teams were all high status, leaders who were experienced at group 
decision-making and consequently they were more or less equal to one another. Our results 
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suggest that teams of experts without differentiated roles are also prone to the information 
sampling bias. 
Conclusions 
The CCL executive teams were more likely to mention information that was widely-
shared and unlikely to mention information that was sparsely sampled before discussion.  This 
pattern emerged even though access to information was not controlled as in a typical laboratory 
study of information pooling.  Thus, the contents of discussions were largely a reflection of what 
individuals were most inclined to access in their information searches.   
Interestingly, however, beyond the point of bringing up information during group 
discussion, the popularity of information had no impact. Whether information was repeated 
during group discussion seemed to depend most directly on how many members had accessed the 
information before discussion. Moreover, how often an item was repeated during group 
discussion affected its likelihood to be documented on the groups’ written protocol. Hence, 
information that is normatively valued tends to emerge in discussion but which items are repeated 
and retained on written summaries seems to depend more on the internal group dynamics.  
Finally, cognitive centrality enhanced influence in the sense that members who shared 
more information links with others were more likely to get the group to adopt a solution that was 
close to their initial individual solution.   Moreover, a cognitively central person was even more 
influential when others in the group were cognitively peripheral.   
 These findings underscore the importance of social sharedness in the deliberations and 
decisions in these executive groups (Kameda, Tindale & Davis, 2003; Tindale & Kameda, 2000).  
At the highest level, socially shared notions in the population from which group were composed 
about what was important simultaneously predicted what group members would access and 
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subsequently what they would discuss.  At the group level, information that was commonly 
accessed by the members was more likely to be repeated once it was mentioned and repetition 
predicted what would end up on the written summaries.  At the individual level, a member was 
more influential if she shared information with others in the group.  
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Footnote 
1A copy of the coding manual can be obtained from Susanne Abele or Garold Stasser. 
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Table 1 
Number of Groups at Each Size and Gender Composition 
_____________________________________________ 
Group Size 
_____________________________________________ 
Gender Composition  6 5 4 
All Male   5 3 3 
Mixed-Gender   6 5 3 
_____________________________________________ 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Predicting whether an item will be mentioned, repeated and listed; standardized partial 
regression included for significant links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2. Predicting member influence from member centrality, average group centrality, and 
correctness of member’s initial solution; partial regression coefficients included for significant 
links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Sharing and Cognitive Centrality 54 
 
 
 
 
	

	
	
		
		
	
			
	
	
	
a.
a. Structural Link: Information could only be repeated if it was already mentioned.
.12 (.018)***
.26 (.110)*
.78 (.007)***
.15 (.032)***
*** p<.0001; * p<.05
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicting whether an item will be mentioned, repeated and listed; standardized partial 
regression included for significant links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 2. Predicting member influence from member centrality, average group centrality, and 
correctness of member’s initial solution; partial regression coefficients included for significant 
links with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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